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Apr 7, 2023Liked by Dan Davies

He's saying stuff that lots of people know, though by no means everyone, and claiming unique insights. That tends to annoy everybody.

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In my view, Taleb has written one big book: Dynamic Hedging. It is a careful distillation of trading experience, comparable to similar famous books. All of his Taleb's flaws can be discerned in it; but they are in embryo. All of his virtues are there in their best form.

I do think that your portrayal of Taleb flatters him by leaving out two of his most irritating characteristics: overconfidence and self-promotion. The overconfidence is a bit rich in someone who is primarily writing smugly about the overconfidence of other people. Self-promotion is what it is: it charms some people and repels others. Wilmott is a similar character who has a similar effect on people. It is telling that these two quarreled while they regarded each other as rivals, but got along well enough once they thought it might be profitable.

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influencers = {overconfidence + self-promotion} It's a thing grandiose narcissists have it in spades.

How do we a) survive them b) disrupt them into something useful or kind, and, c) prevent their future self-creation. Parallel question, how do I get on in the world ethically while a to c fail and they are the competition?

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My opinion of Taleb was shaped by this quickly-deleted tweet: http://web.archive.org/web/20150924032003/https:/twitter.com/nntaleb/status/646695656778821632 it's a multilayered work of literature, of a smart guy as 100x dumbass. Nobody on earth is as smart as Taleb thinks he is. Every word I've read of Taleb since is through the lens of the man who could write that and think he'd scored a zinger.

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Little note on Fannie Mae: I think that Taleb was wrong because he was right, or maybe right because he was wrong. Everybody who was anybody was obsessed with the interest rate risk of GSE portfolios in 2003. Bright people focused on a particular risk can usually reduce it. The same is true for Y2K, Herstatt risk since 1974, or derivatives risk in 2008. US banks had learned how to use derivatives to put market risk on their customers, and thus skated freely in 1997. Etc.

IOW, popular risks are nothing to worry about. The risks that get you are the unpopular ones: the ones adopted by the hippies, and ignored by the cool kids. Such as the SVB risk of a consciously coordinated run. But how to distinguish a hippie from a crank?

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