Maybe it's worth putting some reference to Coase's "Nature of the Firm" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Nature_of_the_Firm). To me, Coase is the anti-Friedman (both at Chicago, both Nobel laureates). At my basic level of understanding, Coase asked "If free markets and coordination by prices and contracts is so great, why do most people work for companies which are run like the USSR in the 1950s, with all-powerful bosses setting top-down targets?". I believe that Coase got his ideas by noting that Russia did not collapse after the revolution as everyone expected in the 1920s, but actually (sort of) thrived.
I take issue with our host's argument that the Friedman doctrine strips corporate actors of social responsibility. Au contraire! It imposes an impossible degree of social responsibility on corporate actors: that they be utter political eunuchs, passively accepting whatever law is given by their government. In Friedman-world, all corporate lobbying is tantamount to Murder, Inc. seeking an exclusive license to conduct its trade.
Outside of Friedman world, corporate social responsibility is the price that firms pay for corporate social power.
I wonder how Friedman would defend corporate actions in the face of most owners of a company owning the company through index funds. Any competitive action taken by a corporation against other companies in the index could easily be detrimental to the overall holdings of the owners.
I'm a few chapters in and enjoying the new book quite a bit. I think more bits of the book that didn't quite make it would be interesting, as well as material that changed enough that you'd write something new. (The evolving world of LLMs for example.)
In actuality there should be seen as no duty from an employee (even management) to an employer, unless explicitly laid out in the employment contract. The employer hires an employee and hopes for the best, just as the employee accepts hiring from an employer and hopes for the best. They each can take whatever lawful actions they deem best.
I've dabbled with legal intellectual history. There are two conceptions of the corporation. One of them is that of Mike and Kaleberg: corporations are the result of government action. The other "organicist" concept of the corporation has also had its vogue, and now appears to be dominant in US law (e.g., the notion of corporations bearing religious rights.) In this concept, incorporation is mere government recognition of an organic social structure.
The notion of the business corporation is relatively new, btw. Few English businesses were incorporated before 1844. Until the late 18th century, incorporation was mostly a churchy or municipal thing ("chartered liberties.") By the end of the 18th century, business corporations were viewed as a kind of public utility in the US, which adopted business incorporation with greater enthusiasm than the UK. This ideology is why most corporations had limited powers throughout much of the 19th century, although this restriction was pretty easy to transact around in the second half of the century. Then the formal floodgates opened, to any legal business.
You are exactly right. Corporations are government chartered collectives. They exist and perform by the grace of government will. Governments used to impose a lot more responsibilities on corporations. It wasn't until the late 19th century that corporations were granted more license. It's been a long time since I've heard any business news involving the term "ultra vires".
I tend to feel the libertarianism is generally incomplete. A government is assumed, and each libertarian gets to argue what level of regulation it provides, what restrictions it can place on contracts, what sanctions it can impose and so on. My view is that we are either all warring bands or we have a government that provides private property as a service. Some government versions of private property have better terms of service than others. Unfortunately, you don't get to opt out except by moving and changing your government services provider, and that doesn't always end well.
Maybe it's worth putting some reference to Coase's "Nature of the Firm" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Nature_of_the_Firm). To me, Coase is the anti-Friedman (both at Chicago, both Nobel laureates). At my basic level of understanding, Coase asked "If free markets and coordination by prices and contracts is so great, why do most people work for companies which are run like the USSR in the 1950s, with all-powerful bosses setting top-down targets?". I believe that Coase got his ideas by noting that Russia did not collapse after the revolution as everyone expected in the 1920s, but actually (sort of) thrived.
I take issue with our host's argument that the Friedman doctrine strips corporate actors of social responsibility. Au contraire! It imposes an impossible degree of social responsibility on corporate actors: that they be utter political eunuchs, passively accepting whatever law is given by their government. In Friedman-world, all corporate lobbying is tantamount to Murder, Inc. seeking an exclusive license to conduct its trade.
Outside of Friedman world, corporate social responsibility is the price that firms pay for corporate social power.
I wonder how Friedman would defend corporate actions in the face of most owners of a company owning the company through index funds. Any competitive action taken by a corporation against other companies in the index could easily be detrimental to the overall holdings of the owners.
I'm a few chapters in and enjoying the new book quite a bit. I think more bits of the book that didn't quite make it would be interesting, as well as material that changed enough that you'd write something new. (The evolving world of LLMs for example.)
In actuality there should be seen as no duty from an employee (even management) to an employer, unless explicitly laid out in the employment contract. The employer hires an employee and hopes for the best, just as the employee accepts hiring from an employer and hopes for the best. They each can take whatever lawful actions they deem best.
I've dabbled with legal intellectual history. There are two conceptions of the corporation. One of them is that of Mike and Kaleberg: corporations are the result of government action. The other "organicist" concept of the corporation has also had its vogue, and now appears to be dominant in US law (e.g., the notion of corporations bearing religious rights.) In this concept, incorporation is mere government recognition of an organic social structure.
The notion of the business corporation is relatively new, btw. Few English businesses were incorporated before 1844. Until the late 18th century, incorporation was mostly a churchy or municipal thing ("chartered liberties.") By the end of the 18th century, business corporations were viewed as a kind of public utility in the US, which adopted business incorporation with greater enthusiasm than the UK. This ideology is why most corporations had limited powers throughout much of the 19th century, although this restriction was pretty easy to transact around in the second half of the century. Then the formal floodgates opened, to any legal business.
You are exactly right. Corporations are government chartered collectives. They exist and perform by the grace of government will. Governments used to impose a lot more responsibilities on corporations. It wasn't until the late 19th century that corporations were granted more license. It's been a long time since I've heard any business news involving the term "ultra vires".
I tend to feel the libertarianism is generally incomplete. A government is assumed, and each libertarian gets to argue what level of regulation it provides, what restrictions it can place on contracts, what sanctions it can impose and so on. My view is that we are either all warring bands or we have a government that provides private property as a service. Some government versions of private property have better terms of service than others. Unfortunately, you don't get to opt out except by moving and changing your government services provider, and that doesn't always end well.